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Abstract
We argue that shocks to a housing market are transmitted through
the hierarchy of quality tiers within a housing market. The result is the
prediction of waves of house price changes accompanied by changes in
transaction volume. Our study is related to existing models of spatial
ripple effects across housing markets. The data are from the Hong
Kong housing market. The findings from Granger causality tests
strongly support the argument that ripple or domino effects within a
single housing market occur in response to external shocks.
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1. Introduction
Housing market dynamics are complex. Theoretical approaches
include models of neighborhood change, filtering, urban growth, and
housing chains. Empirical tests of these models are relatively infrequent,
perhaps due to the complexity of the models or the lack of data.
However, given the importance of home equity to national wealth and
the importance of housing to urban and national economies, there is a
need for studies of house price and transaction dynamics.
Our study focuses on the interrelationships of housing submarkets
where the submarkets are defined by quality tiers. The application is to
Hong Kong, this locality being chosen because their changes in housing
policy form a natural experiment and data are available. One implication
of the empirical findings is that houses of all quality levels are closely
tied together through dynamic processes. Another finding is that price
effects move through the quality continuum of a housing market with
relatively great rapidity. A third is that there is a positive correlation
between the turnover rate of housing and house prices, reaffirming a
relationship found in recent studies of housing markets.
2. Review of Approaches to Housing Market Dynamics
The dynamics of housing markets is first described using a variety
of approaches. We will review filtering models, then models describing
spatial ripples in house price changes. Finally, we review search and
equity effect models, these focusing on the short run consequences of
shocks to the housing market on price and turnover rates. Each of these
models plays a role in guiding our theoretical approach to housing
dynamics.1
The seminal contributions to the theoretical description of the
filtering model were the papers by Sweeney (1974a, 1974b). In filtering
models, the housing market is separated into distinct quality levels. In
equilibrium households are matched to houses of different qualities
according to their income levels and willingness to pay. The model
predicts the long run equilibrium distributions of the quality of housing
units and prices.
In this model, if a set of households’ incomes rise, the group
trades up for the next higher quality homes and the vacant homes
1

Review articles of some aspects of house price dynamics include Gatzlaff and Tirtiroglu
(1995) and Cho (1996), both focusing on housing market efficiency.
2

become available to a lower income group. The short run equilibrium is
disturbed, causing further substitution producing a ripple effect
throughout the quality continuum. One limitation of Sweeney’s model is
that landlords do not face a down payment constraint when purchasing
housing. Thus, the dynamics caused by the interaction of the down
payment constraint and household equity levels are excluded from the
model.
“Ripple effects” in regional house prices have been the focus of
many studies, particularly in the United Kingdom (Alexander and
Barrow 1994, Meen 1999, 2002.)2 It is fairly well established that house
price ripples occur in the U.K. flowing from the southeastern region to
the north. Meen suggests that ripple effects could be caused by four
factors: migration, different reaction speeds to shocks, spatial arbitrage,
and home equity effects.
Migration could cause house price ripples if households relocate
in response to changes in the spatial distribution in house prices (Jones
and Leishman 2006). A ripple-like effect also could be observed if
regions react to economic shocks with different speeds. Meen’s third
explanation is based on the spatial diffusion of house prices, a
manifestation of arbitrage mitigated by search costs. Pollakowski and
Ray (1997) used a VAR model to test whether house price changes in
one region or primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA) predict price
changes in other regions or PMSAs. Their work built on Tirtiroglu
(1992) and Clapp and Tirtiroglu (1994) who found that excess returns in
a housing submarket diffused to other submarkets of the same
metropolitan statistical area. Pollakowski and Ray found statistically
significant cross-market housing price effects at the regional level, but
the pattern of results was not economically sensible. They also found
significant cross-PMSA effects in the New York consolidated
metropolitan statistical area, with a slight preponderance of effects being
for contiguous areas.
Meen’s fourth explanation is based on Stein’s (1995) model where
equity effects are incorporated into the housing market. Stein’s notes
that households who wish to own must make a down payment and pay
closing costs. If house prices are rising, current owners’ home equity
2

Oikarinen (2006) studied the Finnish housing market and finds evidence that house
prices changes move from central city to surrounding area. Cook has numerous studies
(2006) of ripple effects in the U.K. housing market.
3

rises, increasing their wealth and allowing them to make a larger down
payment on another, more expensive, home. Thus, increased house
prices facilitate trading-up and thus transaction volume should increase.
Stein showed that this effect is enhanced if minimum down payment
requirements constrain a large percentage of current owners’ choice of
dwelling. Similarly, if house prices fall, a household’s equity falls, and
this household’s ability to purchase another house is reduced, perhaps
greatly. Transaction volume should fall at the same time that house
prices are falling. One test of Stein’s hypothesis was by Lamont and
Stein (1999) who found that real house prices are more sensitive to
shocks to per capita income in cities where a relatively high percentage
of homeowners have a high loan to value ratio.
Hort (2000) also argued that changes in the turnover rate in
housing are linked with changes in house prices. The basis for this
argument is a search model developed by Berkovec and Goodman
(1996). Hort explained that sellers establish list prices based on their
expectations of sales prices, these expectations influenced by recent
market prices and the recent “ease of selling”. Buyers’ offers are
influenced by recent prices but also are subject to demand shocks such
as unexpected changes in unemployment, income, population growth,
mortgage interest rates, and migration. Thus, the distribution of buyers’
offers moves before that of sellers’ reservation prices. The result is a
rapid change in the turnover rate as the market quickly clears in upmarkets and houses remain unsold in down-markets.3 Initially there is
little upward price movement in the up-market because sellers have
previously set list prices based on the set of price expectations at the
time of listing. There is little downward price movement initially in a
down-market because even though houses remain unsold, those that sell
do so near their list price (skimming off the upper tail of the distribution
of buyers’ offers). However, as sellers become aware of the change in
the expected marketing time for a home, they adjust their list prices,
inducing a positive correlation between the turnover rate and house
price changes. Hort (2000) found the dynamics of the Swedish housing
market followed this model’s predictions.

3

This model is further elaborated in Fisher et al. (2003) where it is applied to the
commercial property market.
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3. The Model
The literature suggests a number of reasons why external shocks
to a housing market could lead to the observation of a chain of house
price changes. We next present a stylized model of a housing market
with multiple quality levels of housing, matching its structure to that of
our data set from the Hong Kong housing market. This focus results in
particular assumptions, relevant for Hong Kong, that simplify the model.
More general models can be found in Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006),
and Gervais (2002). We also highlight the role of changes in wealth and
the repercussions in the housing market. The role of housing as an
investment good and store of wealth has been highlighted by Henderson
and Ioannides (1983).
Renters live in the lowest quality tier, and there are two quality
levels of owner-occupied housing (this being generalizable to many
quality levels). Household wealth plays a prominent role in determining
housing demand, and we include a down payment constraint. When a
positive shock to the wealth of renter households occurs, it increases the
demand for the lowest tier owner-occupied houses, thus increasing their
price. This price increase subsequently leads to greater demand and
price increases in higher quality tiers of the housing market. Similarly,
the increase in transactions among lower tier housing temporally leads
increases in transaction volume in higher quality markets. These
responses in price and volume can be characterized as a “domino effect”
flowing through the quality continuum. Negative price shocks to the
lowest quality tier of housing or the rental market will have similar
effects in the opposite direction, leading to downward pressure on house
prices and reductions in transaction volume in higher quality tiers. We
expect that the effect will be larger among households that are down
payment constrained.
3.1 The Market Structure
The market structure we consider includes a rental housing market
and two types of owner-occupied housing: low (A) and high (B) quality.
We assume that housing in the rental market is lower quality than
owner-occupied housing and it is provided by the government to

5

accommodate lower income people. 4 All households are utility
maximizers. Rental housing tenants may choose to upgrade their
housing and become homeowners when it is advantageous to do so.
Owner-occupiers also may buy and sell property. We also assume that
dwelling units in each category of housing are homogeneous and each
household occupies only one unit of housing. The model considers the
response to a positive shock to the wealth of renters.
The total stock of low-quality owner-occupied housing at the end
of a period is given by:
(1) SA = HA + θA ( p A − p A ),
θA > 0 for p A > p A
where HA is the initial housing stock at the beginning of the period. θA is
a supply response coefficient that generates additional supply by the end
of the period whenever housing price p A > p A . Thus, any new demand (nA)
has to be met either by sales of existing houses (iA) and/or by additional
supply from developers.
Similarly, the supply of high-quality homes B depends on its
housing price pc:
θB> 0 for pB > pB
(2) SB = HB + θB ( pB − pB ),
The critical supply prices, p A and pB , are exogenous and represent
prices below which developers in each of the markets would not find it
profitable to supply new housing.5
In the initial state of steady state equilibrium, demand for housing
is equal to the stock of housing for each market, and renters live in
residences supplied by the government. For simplicity we assume
depreciation is zero.
Suppose the initial equilibrium price of low-quality housing is p A
and the number of households who own homes is iA. Thus the initial
total demand for housing stock in A is iA hA. Given the supply of housing
A in (1), we have market A’s stock equilibrium condition:
(3) iA hA = HA.
Similarly, suppose the initial equilibrium price of the high-quality
market B before any shocks occur is pB , and the number of households
4

This assumption is reasonable for our application to Hong Kong. It also provides a
mechanism for introducing exogenous shocks to the rental market through changes in
government policies. Shocks could also be introduced through a private sector rental
market.
5
That is, they represent construction and land costs.
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who own homes in market B is iB. Market B’s stock equilibrium
condition is:
(4) iB hB = HB.
Because B is the highest quality housing market, it is assumed that
homeowners cannot trade up further. This assumption can be relaxed
and the results inferred from activities in market A.
Additional new demand for high-quality homes (nB) has to be met
by the expansion of the supply, triggered by a price of pB beyond pB .
From this initial equilibrium, we examine the implications of rental
tenants’ wealth increasing (Ortalo-Magne and Rady 2006). When
tenants in government provided housing have acquired sufficient
savings, their utility maximizing behavior will lead them to bid for
housing in market A and become first-time homeowners (Bardhan, et al.
2003).
3.2 The Model’s Solution
In Appendix A, we describe the simplifying assumptions that
convert a household’s dynamic optimization problem into a static
optimization problem. The equilibrium solution of the two housing
markets is derived in Appendix B. A variable list of the model is given
at the end of Appendix B. We assume all households have identical
utility functions but have different amounts of lifetime wealth. The
lifetime wealth of the household, K, comprises the present value of all
future income plus the value of all assets. For someone who becomes a
homeowner at the end of period t-1, the value of K at the end of period t
is:
(5) Kt = Kt-1 + capital appreciation through time t.
We assume that wealth varies among households and they can be
sorted by wealth in descending order from largest to smallest with
unique index i. For simplicity, we assume the distribution of K is a
linear function of i, with the total number of households assumed to be
equal to 2 K τ . Suppressing the time period subscripts, the wealth of
household i is:
(6) K (i) = 2 K − i / τ .
Thus, the greatest wealth of any households is 2 K , the lowest wealth is
zero, and the average wealth is K . Hence, for a critical value K*, we
have:
(7) i* = 2τK − τK *
7

where i* gives the number of households with wealth greater than or
equal to K*.
We next determine the demand for housing in the low-quality
housing market A after a positive shock to renters’ wealth has occurred.
Changing wealth impacts housing choices directly as a household’s
lifetime wealth changes and also through the effects of the down
payment constraint. Household i will purchase a house if and only if its
wealth K(i) is greater than a critical value K*A ,
(8) K(i) > K*A =ϕA pA - ϕRA
where K*A defined in equation (A17) of Appendix A,6 and ϕA and ϕRA
are parameters defined also in this appendix. Otherwise, the household
will not purchase a house and will remain in the rental market.
The number of renter households (nA’) that satisfy the wealth
constraint and intend to change to ownership in market A is found by
substituting (9) into (7), yielding:
(9) nA’ = 2τK '−τK A* = 2τK '−τ ϕ A p A + τ ϕ RA
where pA is market A’s new price to be determined by the market
equilibrium condition, which has now been affected with the average
wealth changing from K to K ' .
Suppose there is an additional ‘liquid wealth’ (W) constraint, at
time t, following Stein's (1995) down payment hypothesis:
WA ≥ c.q +(1- ϕL) pAhA
where time subscript t is omitted for simplicity. WA is the ‘liquid wealth’
at time t for a potential buyer in market A, this defined as anything that
the household currently owns that can be sold reasonably quickly for
money without incurring a loss. Also, hA is the size of one unit of
housing in market A, pA is the price of housing in market A, (1- ϕL) is
the percentage of down-payment defined in Appendix A(ii), (1- ϕL)pAhA
is the amount of down payment, and c and q are the quantity and price
of the composite nonhousing goods, respectively.
Suppose at time t, only a proportion (γA) of households
simultaneously satisfy the wealth constraint and the liquid wealth
constraint. The number of households satisfying the lifetime wealth
constraint is given by (9), nA’. Therefore the additional number of
households satisfying both the total and liquid wealth constraints and
thus are able to afford a home in market A is:
6

The proof is provided in Appendix A.
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(10) nA=γA nA’ = γ A (2τK '−τ ϕ A p A + τ ϕ RA )
Equation (10) implies that nA increases with the mean wealth K ' and
decreases with housing price pA. From equation (B6) of Appendix B, we
have the following result.
Proposition 1. A positive shock d K to the wealth of renters, who are
potential buyers in the low-quality housing market, will increase the
prices of homes in market A. This is indicated by:
dp A 2τh Aγ A
=
>0,
∆
dK

where ∆ is defined in equation (B5) of Appendix B and it is shown to
be positive.
We now consider the transmission of the renter wealth shock
through market A to the high-quality housing market B. The availability
of units in market A for renters who wish to buy is subject to the
willingness of existing homeowners to sell. This willingness is
conditional on their utilities being higher after trading up to market B
compared with staying put.
The wealth of households in market A as potential buyers in
market B can be represented by:
KnB(i, t)= KiA(i,t-1)+ pA (t)hA - pA(t-1)hA -Ψm
where Ψm is the remaining mortgage. Suppressing the time indices t and
t-1, and rewriting pA(t-1)hA +Ψm as φm, the mean wealth K nB of the
potential buyers in market B is given by:
(11) K nB = K iA + pAhA − φm
where K iA is the mean wealth of KiA(i,t-1). Equation (11) implies that an
increase of the price in the low-quality housing market will increase the
wealth of potential buyers; that is:
(12)

∂K nB
= hA > 0 .
∂p A

Potential buyers in market B also are potential sellers in market A.
But the actual number of sellers is given below by (13) after
incorporating a down payment constraint similar to that in market A [cf.
(10)]:
(13) nB = γB ( 2τ K nB - τ K*B ) = γB ( 2τ K nB - τ ϕB pB + τ ϕBA pA - τ ϕB0 )
where pA and pB are housing prices to be determined by the market
equilibrium condition, K*B, ϕB, ϕBA and ϕB0 are defined in equation
(A20) of Appendix A, and γB is the proportion of households satisfying
the total wealth constraint that also satisfy the liquid wealth constraint.

9

We assume there are no households in market B that sell their
houses and thus all new demand must be met by estate developers. Thus
the total demand in market B is nBhB + iBhB, which must equal total
supply [cf. (2)]. Hence:
(14) nBhB + iBhB = θB ( pB - pB ) + HB.
Substituting (4) and (13) into (14), we have:
(15) γB ( 2τ K nB hB - τ ϕB pB hB + τ ϕBA pA hB - τ ϕB0 hB ) = θB( pB - pB ).
Solving for the house price level yields:
(16) p B =

2τ hB K nB γ B + p Aτ ϕ BA hB γ B − τ ϕ B 0 hB γ B + θ B p B

θ B + τ ϕ B hB γ B

.

From (16) we find:
(17)

2τh B γ B
∂p B
=
>0
∂K nB θ B + τϕ B hB γ B

which leads to proposition 2.
Proposition 2. A price increase in the low-quality market will increase
the price of the high-quality market through the channels of: (i) a wealth
effect, and (ii) a substitution effect.
Proof.
From (16), we have:
(18)

∂p B
τϕ BA hB γ B
=
>0
∂p A θ B + τϕ B hB γ B

hence,
(19)

dp B  ∂p B
=
dp A  ∂K nB

[2h A + ϕ BA ]τ hBγ B
 ∂K nB  ∂p B

 +
=
> 0.
θ B + τϕ B hB γ B
 ∂p A  ∂p A

To the extent that this is a process that takes time, we expect that in our
empirical test that price changes in the low quality market will lead
price changes in the high quality market.
 ∂p  ∂K 

The wealth effect is given by  B  nB  . The first term,
 ∂K nB  ∂p A 
and the second term,

∂K nB
∂p A

∂p B
∂K nB

,

, can derived from (16) and (12), respectively.

Both terms are positive, which implies that increased low-quality
housing prices will raise the wealth of the homeowners in market A who
are considering moving to market B.
The substitution effect is given by

∂p B
∂p A

, which is obtained directly

from (18). The substitution effect is positive because the houses in the
low- and high-quality markets are substitutes. Increased low-quality
10

housing prices will reduce the demand for the houses in this market and
will induce demand for high-quality houses. As a result, the housing
price in the high-quality market rises.
Combining the results in Proposition 1 and 2, we have:
Proposition 3. A positive shock to the wealth of potential buyers in the
low-quality market will increase house prices in the high-quality market.
Proof.
(20)

dp B  dp B  dp A   ∂p B  ∂K nB  ∂p B  dp A 
+


=

 = 

dK '  dp A  dK '   ∂K nB  ∂p A  ∂p A  dK ' 
2τ 2 h A hB [2h A + ϕ BA ]γ Aγ B
>0
=
∆(θ B + τ ϕ B hBγ B )

where ∆>0 is defined in equation (B5) of Appendix B. This expression
is derived directly from Propositions 2 and 3.
We summarize the transmission channels of a positive wealth
shock K ' initiated in the low-quality housing market A as follows:
(i) The shock raises housing prices in market A:

dp A
>0,
dK '

[Proposition 1].

(ii) The increase in pA increases the wealth of households in market A,
some of whom then enter the next highest quality housing market B:
∂K nB
> 0,
∂p A

[(12)].

(iii) The house price increase in A is transmitted to house prices in the
high-quality housing market via the increase of the wealth of
households in market A:

∂p B
> 0,
∂K nB

[(17)].

(iv) The house price increase in A also increases the price of highquality housing through the substitution effect:

∂p B
>0
∂p A

[(18)].

(v) Based on (i) to (iv) above, we find that a positive shock initiated in
the rental market will be transmitted throughout all levels of the housing
market,
eventually
to
the
highest
quality
level:
dp B  dp B  dp A   ∂p B

=
 = 
dK '  dp A  dK '   ∂K nB

 ∂K nB

 ∂p A

 ∂p B  dp A 
 +
 > 0.

 ∂p A  dK ' 

The model implies that the transmission channel of a positive
wealth shock is unidirectional; that is, the causality goes from the lowquality market to the high-quality market. Exogenous positive shocks
initiated from the high-quality market, (KBX), will not be transmitted into

11

the low-quality market A; that is:
 dp  dp B
dp A
=  A 
dK BX  dp B  dK BX


 = 0 .


∂p A
=0
∂p B

. 7 Thus, we find that

The reason is that this shock will elicit a supply

adjustment in the high-quality market and the resulting housing price
increase. Households in the next lower housing market could not
“afford” a home in the high quality market prior to the shock and thus
they certainly cannot afford the new price. Thus, there is no change in
either demand or supply in the lower quality market; hence, its house
price will not be affected by the positive shock in the higher quality
market.8
Finally, from equation (B10) of Appendix B, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 4. Increasing the number of transactions for lower tier
housing nA will tend to increase the number of transactions for higher
tier housing nB,
dn B
> 0.
dn A

4. The Hong Kong Housing Market
Hong Kong provides a unique opportunity to test this theory (see
Ho (2006) for additional description of the Hong Kong market). About
40 percent of the population lived in public rental housing during the
1980s.9 Public rental housing (PRH) accounts for about 70 percent of
the total public housing program, the remaining 30 percent being in the
form of “Home Ownership Scheme” housing (HOS). Heavy subsidies
provided a significant incentive for households to remain in the public
rental sector even for those who had the resources to become

7

8

9

Recall that we do not allow for depreciation of housing and thus we do not allow for
effects through filtering as in Sweeney’s (1974a, 1974b) models.
One could model a negative shock to a high quality market B. Some households in
market B would move into low quality market A. Market A would benefit from the new
demand as price of housing in market A rises, and thus supply rises too. The renter
market could be affected in the sense that renters who otherwise would have moved to
market A could find that the prices is not affordable and so they will remain in the rental
market longer than otherwise. Due to space constraints, a formal analysis of these effects
is deferred to future research.
Hong Kong’s population was 5.7 million in 1990 and 6.7 million in 2000. In 2000, there
were 2.1 million dwelling units.
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homeowners.10 Nevertheless, every year there is a stream of purchasers
from among the PRH who buy private housing for investment purposes
as well as to improve their housing conditions. In 1996 and 1997,
almost 10,000 households per year moved to owned private/HOS
housing from public rental housing units, probably reflecting a
perceived stepping up of the policy to make richer tenants pay higher
rent and a new policy to make the tenure in public rental housing not
inheritable.
For many years the typical loan-to-value ratio in Hong Kong’s
banks was 70% of the appraised value of the property. Thus the down
payment requirement posed a significant constraint to potential buyers.
Most households of modest means were equity constrained and needed
to get a committed buyer before moving to a better housing unit. This
effect is somewhat less likely to occur among higher income
homeowners because the down payment constraint was less likely to be
binding.
Beginning in April 1987, the Hong Kong Housing Authority
undertook a series of policy changes that decreased the incentive for
households to remain in public rental housing.11 First, it required tenants
who had been housed for over ten years in the program and who had
income exceeding twice that of the Waiting List Income Limit, (WLIL)
to pay double rent.12 The Housing Authority relaxed this requirement
slightly in April 1993, when households with income exceeding twice
the WLIL were required to pay 1.5 times the rent, while those with
10

With average rent set at no more than 10 per cent of the median household income of
tenants, the implicit subsidies in public rental housing were substantial. Also, until quite
recently Hong Kong protected the tenure of public housing tenants. Regardless of changes
in financial conditions, a family and its children could remain in the unit (Housing
Authority 1993). These subsidies provided a significant incentive for households to
remain in the public rental sector even though they had the resources to become
homeowners. In 1996 the Housing Authority recommended that household income and net
asset value determine PRH household's eligibility to continue to receive public housing
subsidy (Housing Authority 1996). PRH tenants whose household income and net asset
value exceed the prescribed limits, or who choose not to make a declaration, have to pay
market rent.
11
The Housing Authority is a statutory body set up by the Hong Kong government. The
Authority has responsibility for housing matters and public housing development.
12
The Housing Authority maintains a waiting list for applicants to public housing. The total
monthly income of the applicant and his/her family members must not exceed the
maximum limits as stated by the Housing Authority. The incentive to invest in homes also
was encouraged by high inflation and buttressed by a rapidly growing economy.
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income exceeding three times the WLIL had to pay double the rent.13 In
April 1996, public policy changed again. Tenants of public housing
whose household income and net asset value exceeded prescribed limits
had to pay market rent (Housing Authority 1995, 1996). With such
policies in place, and with a booming economy offering opportunities
for upward mobility, it came as no surprise that a survey conducted by
the Housing Authority in 1992-1993 showed that 24 per cent of home
purchases in the market were by public housing tenants and that over 13
per cent of tenants owned one or more residential properties. This
activity was clearly also a result of the sizable savings accumulated
during the high growth and high inflation period in the 1980s and early
1990s (Watanabe, 1998).14
The final change in public policy that we consider was announced
on December 8, 1997. The “Tenants Purchase Scheme” (TPS) allowed
existing public rental housing tenants to purchase their own flats at up to
an 88 percent discount from the estimated market price, provided that
the sitting tenants committed to buy within a specified period. The units
were priced from about HK$ 70,000 (less than US$ 10,000) to about
HK$ 300,000. The scheme was implemented in phases, with each phase
covering about 25,000 tenants, starting in 1998. This policy reversed the
previous incentive of tenants in public rental housing to leave their
dwellings and move into the ownership market.
The announcement of the TPS program in 1997 greatly changed
the incentive structure for existing tenants in the public rental program.
They no longer had reason to buy expensive HOS housing or private
sector homes. Even rich tenants could purchase the rental unit at
discounted prices. The expected effect would be to greatly reduce the
flow of these households into the private sector ownership market.
13

Rent in public sector rental housing is inclusive of “rates,” which are similar to the U.S.
property tax. Specifically, rates are a tax levied on the “ratable value” of the property as
assessed by the Rating and Valuation Department.
14
For example, Wanatabe (1998) reports that mean monthly household savings in 1989-90
by households residing in the Housing Authority’s rental flats (PRH) program was HK$
636 and their mean monthly expenditure was HK$ 7,364. For PRH participants in the 50th
to 74th income deciles, the mean monthly savings increased to HK$ 2,924. For those PRH
renters in the 75th to 89th income deciles, monthly savings was HK$ 6,459 and those in the
top 10% of the income distribution saved HK$ 16,635 per month. The high amounts of
savings increased in the early 1990s; for example, the amount was HK$ 15,716 for those
in the 75th to 89th income deciles and similarly greater than 1989-90 for other income
levels.
14

Figure 1 shows a general upwards trend in property transactions (mainly
residential, but also inclusive of commercial and industrial) from 1987
through 1997 (but there was a downwards trend from 1991 through
1996), but then a dramatic decline following the announcement of the
TPS in December 1997. These data generally correspond to our
expectations, but they report only the aggregate number of transactions
while our interest focuses on ripple effects within the quality continuum.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
5. Data and Empirical Tests
House price data for four classes of housing from the period 1987
to 2004 were obtained from the Hong Kong Rating and Valuation
Department. The housing classes are defined according to the size of
housing unit: Class A (under 40 m2), Class B (40-60 m2), Class C (7099.9 m2), and Class D (100 m2 and above).15 The Ratings and Valuation
Department house price indices “are designed to measure rental and
price changes with quality kept at a constant” (Hong Kong Property
Review 2001).16 We expect that the above described changes in housing
policy would first affect house prices in Class A units, followed by B, C,
and D.
Our second data set relates to monthly transaction volume data for
1995 to 2004. These data pertain to existing private housing transactions
and were obtained from the Land Registry: Centaline Databank
Management Department. We separate properties by price and observe
the time series of transactions. House price categories are: Home
Ownership Scheme housing (HOS), 1-2 million $HK, 2-3 million, 3-5
million, and 5-10 million.
5.1 Housing Price Dynamics Test
The first empirical test is a causality test of whether house price
changes in smaller properties lead those in larger properties throughout
15

All units are private domestic units, this defined as independent dwellings with separate
cooking facilities and bathroom/lavatory. Our class D merges class D and class E data
from the official definition.
16
The house price index is derived using all transactions that occurred in a particular period
in a particular class of dwelling. The index accounts for variations in property size and
quality by comparing transaction price to the ratable value of the property. Thus, observed
variations in nominal house prices are compared with a time invariant value, yielding
measures of the change in price.
15

the distribution of property sizes. Under the standard Granger test
(1969), if X causes Y, then changes in X should precede changes in Y.
That is, lagged values of X can help improve the prediction of current
values of Y. First, we estimate the unrestricted model:
(20)

k

k

i =1

i =1

Yt = µ t + ∑ α i Yt −1 + ∑ β i X t −1 + ε t .

Next we estimate the restricted model:
k

(21)

Yt = µ t + ∑ α i Yt −1 + ε t .
i =1

The null hypothesis that X does not Granger-cause Y (Ho : β1= β2= ··· =
βk =0) can be tested by the reported F-statistics. If the coefficients on the
lagged values of X are jointly and significantly different from zero, the
null hypothesis can be rejected. Y is said to be Granger-caused by X.17
We begin the analysis by checking the stationarity of the price
series using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. This check is
necessary because the Granger Causality tests require all time series be
stationary. Table 1 shows that the null hypothesis that the price series
contain a unit root cannot be rejected for any series, indicating they are
non-stationary. Each variable was transformed into a first-difference
form to achieve stationarity. In implementing equation (1), in order to
avoid the ambiguity in choosing the lag lengths, we use the Akaike’s
final prediction error criterion to determine the optimal lag
specifications.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
Six sets of the Granger test results are reported in Table 2.
Although we cannot reject the null hypothesis that “the price
movements of Class A do not cause those in Class B,” we can reject the
null that price movements in Class A do not cause those in Class C (1%
level) and Class D (1% level). Also, we can reject the null hypotheses
that “price movements in Class B do not cause those in Class C “(1%
level) and “price movements in Class B do not cause those in Class D”
(1% level). Similarly, we can reject the null that “price movements in
17

The VECM approach (standard Granger causality test augmented with error-correction
terms) is not applicable here because these variables are not cointegrated during the period
1987 to 2000. The absence of cointegration notwithstanding, a short run causal relation
may still exist, which can be determined using the conventional Granger causality test
(VAR approach).
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Class C do not cause those in Class D” (5% level). All of these results
support the hypotheses that price changes in low quality properties lead
those of higher quality properties during this period. A ripple effect of
prices upwards through the quality continuum is apparent.
We also find that the Granger tests do not support reverse
causality. Price changes in Class B, C, and D do not Granger cause
those in Class A. Neither do price changes in Class C or D Granger
cause those in Class B. Finally, we find that price changes in Class D do
not Granger cause those in Class C. Thus, all of the tests support a
single direction of the price ripple as predicted by the model.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
5.2 Housing Transaction Dynamics Test
In a market where many households are down paymentconstrained, the model predicts patterns in the number of transactions,
again beginning with low quality housing and continuing upwards
through the quality continuum. Our base level is the publicly subsidized
Homeownership Scheme housing (HOS). Typically, the households
who are HOS owners were previously tenants in public rental housing
and they were given preference as “green form applicants”, although the
public may apply as “white form applicants” by satisfying specified
income and asset level tests. As described above, after December 1997
when the TPS was announced, public rental housing tenants’ demand
for HOS housing fell dramatically because they could purchase their
rental unit at as low as 12% of the estimated market price. This drop in
demand for HOS housing should reduce transaction volume, price, and
equity among HOS owners. Our model predicts that negative effects on
HOS transactions would be transmitted upwards through the quality
continuum.
[INSERT TABLE 3]
Our results are reported in Table 3. The total number of
transactions over the period from 1995 to 2004 by house value category
ranges from 182,510 in the one to two million $HK category, to 94,341
for two to three million $HK, to 75,702 for three to five million $HK, to
42,430 for five to ten million $HK. We find that changes in the
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transaction volume of HOS housing Granger-caused changes in
transaction volume in all higher valued housing. This is convincing
evidence that the lowest tier of housing quality was the leading
submarket in terms of changing transaction volume. There is no
evidence of reverse causality from higher to lower quality levels.
In addition, changes in the transaction volume of private homes
valued between one and two million $HK Granger-caused changes in
transaction volume for all groups of houses with higher prices. Thus,
booms or busts in the submarket for low quality housing are passed on
with a lag to the next highest quality housing, and subsequently from
this level to higher valued levels. However, no clear causality in
transactions was found among the pairs 2 to 3 million versus 3 to 5
million; 2 to 3 million versus 5 to 10 million; and 3 to 5 million versus 5
to 10 million. Causality from the lowest category and HOS housing to
higher categories is clear, while causality from the intermediate price
categories to higher price categories is less clear.
As shown in table 3, the AIC criterion identifies 1 lag for cases (1),
(2), (3) and (4); 3 lags for case (7). (8), (9) and (10); and 5 lags for case
(5) and (6). Thus, the evidence suggests that the ripple effect on
transaction, when it exists, takes one to five months to transmit to the
higher tiers.
5.3 Tenant Purchase Scheme Effects
The above evidence characterizes the Hong Kong housing market
in general form. Next, we present a specific test of the impact of the
Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS), which was announced on December 8,
1997. This program allowed sitting tenants in the public rental housing
program to purchase their unit at a deep discount from market price. Our
dependent variable is the monthly number of purchases of existing
homes in the period surrounding the announcement of the TPS program.
The first test is of the impact of the announcement of the TPS. We
create a dummy variable that takes the value 1 during this period and is
0 before December 1997. We expect the coefficient on this variable to
be negative.
Confounding the analysis of the impact of the TPS was the advent
of the Asian financial crisis (AFC), this beginning in the third quarter of
1997 (Tsang and Ma, 2002). We expect that increased uncertainty about
the HK-US dollar link would discourage purchase of HK dollar
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denominated assets, particularly homes, and thus reduce turnover. We
use the difference between the spot exchange rate and the one-year
forward rate to measure the AFC 18 . This measure does not require
subjective judgment as to when the crisis began and when it phased out.
It also is highly sensitive to the swings of market confidence during
financial crises. The variable is normalized and constrained to be
between zero and unity. We also include in the regression a measure of
the rate of house price appreciation during the previous year. This value
is measured by the average price appreciation during the past six months
as compared to one year earlier. As discussed above, greater house price
appreciation relaxes households’ down payment constraints and thus
increases the ability of homeowners to trade up the housing quality
continuum.
[INSERT TABLE 4]
The results of the estimation are in Table 4.19 We find that the
Tenants Purchase Scheme had a significant and large negative impact on
the volume of residential property transactions. Because our dependent
variable measures the volume of transactions in the secondary market
(private and public housing), we are capturing all of the ripple effects
described above. There is some evidence that the Asian Financial Crisis
dampened transaction volume, and some evidence that high rates of
house price appreciation increase transaction volume, but neither
coefficient is statistically significant.
6. Conclusions
While a number of empirical studies have analyzed the spatial
dispersion of shocks to house prices, we focus on modeling the short run
dynamic changes of house prices and transaction volume in a single
market. Our model highlights the role of wealth shocks to the housing
market and the resulting domino effect in prices and transactions,
working through the housing quality continuum.
An application of the model is to data from Hong Kong. Shocks to
the rental housing market were due to changes in the Hong Kong
Housing Authority’s policies. The first policy change was one that
18
19

This method was first used by Ho (2000), Chapter 18.
Both the transaction volume and price appreciation series are stationary.
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increased the flow of public housing renters to the private ownership
market, the second being one that dramatically decreased this flow. We
find strong evidence that these policy changes resulted in price and
transactions volume changes throughout the quality continuum,
spreading from low quality unit to high quality tiers. These results are
consistent with the predictions of our model of short run housing market
dynamics and they highlight the interconnectedness of the housing
market within a locality. It is important to note that our results do not
prove that changes in wealth were the precise cause of the changes in
Hong Kong’s housing market, but the observed changes in house prices
and transaction volumes closely follow the model’s predictions.
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Appendix
A: The Dynamic Optimization Model
Households maximize the expected present value of utility:
∞

(A1) Max E(U) = ∑ δ t u(h, ct )
t =0

where δ is the discount factor, ct is the composite consumption of
nonhousing goods and services at time t, h is housing consumption
which is represented by a composite index of “housing service” of the
house. In our two-market model, we assume that housing services are
available in set discrete units with hR < hA < hB, where R indicates rental
housing, and A and B indicate low- and high-quality owner-occupied
housing.
Homes are purchased only for owners’ occupation. All rented
units are assumed to be owned by the government, this assumption
relevant for our particular empirical application, but otherwise
dispensable. The choice variables for a household are ct and h. ct is a
continuous variable which is optimized according to its first-order
condition. h is a discrete choice variable that is chosen among hR, hA ,or
hB, whichever gives the highest present-value of utility, U.
For simplicity, we assume:
(A2) u(h,ct) ≡ β1ln(h)+β2ln(ct)
A (i) Optimization for Renter Households
Assume that pR represents the present value of rent to be paid per
unit of housing if the household remains a tenant indefinitely. Thus,
pRhR is the present value cost of renting a house in market R. For such a
tenant, the relevant budget constraint is:
∞

(A3) ∑ δ t ct qt + pR hR = K
t =0

where qt is the price of the nonhousing composite good, K includes the
present value of labor and non-labor income and the value of all assets.
Because our focus is on the housing market, we simplify by assuming
that the price of consumption qt, and wealth K are exogenous.
To solve the household dynamic optimization problem, we write
the Lagrangian of the problem as follows (Dixit 1990):
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∞
∞
(A4) L = ∑ δ t u(h, ct ) - λ ∑ δ t ct qt + hR p R − K 

 t =0

t =0



= ∑ δ t [β1 ln(h ) + β 2 ln(ct )] - λ ∑ δ t ct qt + hR p R − K  .
∞

∞

 t =0

t =0



The first-order conditions are:
(A5) ∂ L/∂ ct = δ t

β2
ct

− λqt δ t

=0

∞

(A6) ∂ L/∂λ = ∑ δ t ct .qt + p R hR

=K.

t =0

Simplifying (A5) yields:
β2
.
λqt

(A7) ct =

Substituting (A7) into (A6), we have:
∞

∑δ

t

β2

ϕ1
qt
=
K − p R hR K − p R hR

(A8) λ =

t =0

.

The maximized utility of a renter household is thus:
∞

∞

t =0

t =0

(A9) U(hR) = ∑ δ t u(hR , ct ) = ∑ δ t (β1 ln hR + β 2 ln ct )


β
= ∑ δ t  β1 ln hR + β 2 ln 2 + β 2 ln( K − p R hR )  .
ϕ 1 qt
t =0


∞

A (ii) Optimization for Renters Moving to Market A
Assume the current price of one unit of housing is ph. That is, pAhA
is the purchase price of a house in market A. Assume that households
must pay a fraction of the housing price as a down-payment (1-φL)phh,
where φL is the loan-to-value ratio. Their mortgage loan φLphh is
characterized by a fixed interest rate of r and a fixed monthly repayment
schedule. Then the period fixed-payment (hF) is obtained by solving the
following present-value formula (Mishkin 2003):
Loan amount = φL ph h =

N

Fh

∑ (1 + r )
t =1

N

t

= F h.∑
t =1

1
(1 + r ) t

= F h f(r).

This equation states that the value of the loan equals to the sum of the
present value of the period payments. Hence,
(A10)F = φL ph / f(r).
The household’s present-value, life-long, wealth K, constraint is:
∞

∑δ c q
t =0

t

t t

N

+ (1 − φL ) ph h + ∑ δ t hF = K + ph h .
t =1

That is,
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∞

N

t =0

t =1

(A11) ∑ δ t ct qt − φL ph h + ∑ δ t hF = K .
K includes the present-value of life-long, labor and non-labor income of
the household and other assets, evaluated before the decision of whether
to buy a house. If the decision is to buy, then the ex post K becomes K”
= K + the present value of the house net of outstanding mortgage
liabilities. If the decision is to remain a renter, then K remains
unchanged.
To solve the household dynamic optimization problem, we write
the Lagrangian of the problem as follows (Dixit 1990):
N
∞
∞
(A12)L = ∑ δ t u(h, ct ) - λ ∑ δ t ct .qt − φ L .h. p h + ∑ δ t hF − K 

 t =0

t =0



t =1

= ∑ δ t [β1 ln(h ) + β 2 ln(ct )] - λ ∑ δ t ct .qt − φ L .h. ph + ∑ δ t h.φ L . ph / f (r ) − K  .
∞

∞

N

 t =0

t =0

t =1

The first-order conditions are:
(A13)∂L/∂ct = δ t

β2
ct

− λqt δ t

= 0, which gives: ct =

∞

N

φL ph h

t =0

t =1

f (r )

(A14)∂L/∂λ = ∑ δ t ct qt − φ L ph h + ∑ δ t

=K



β2
λqt

.

Substituting (A13) into (A14) yields:
∞

(A15)λ =

∑δ

t

β2
qt

t =0


φ 
K −  − φ L + ∑ δ t L  ph h
f (r ) 
t =1

N

=

ϕ1
.
K − ϕ 2h ph

The maximized utility of a household that bought a house in market A is
thus:
∞

∞

t =0

t =0

(A16)U(hA) = ∑ δ t u(hR , ct ) = ∑ δ t (β1 ln h A + β 2 ln ct )


β
= ∑ δ t  β1 ln h A + β 2 ln 2 + β 2 ln( K − ϕ 2 A p A )  .
ϕ1qt
t =0


∞

If the utility of a household as an owner in market A (A16) is greater
than that as a renter (A9), U(hA)> U(hR), then the household will enter
market A and buy a house; otherwise, it will rent. A home purchase
occurs if and only if:
 K − ϕ2 A pA 
 > 0 .
 K − p R hR 

β1 ln(h A / hR ) + β 2 ln

Define
(A17)

K *A =

ϕ 2 A p A − (hA / hR ) − β / β p R hR
1

1 − (hA / hR )

2

− β1 / β 2
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= ϕA pA - ϕRA

.

where ϕA >0 since hA / hR > 1. If and only if K>K*A, will U(hA)> U(hR).
In this case the household will enter market A to buy a new house;
otherwise, it will remain a renter.
A (iii) Optimization for Homeowners in Market A Moving to Market B
The availability of units in market A for new buyers is subject to
the willingness of the existing homeowners in that market to sell. This
willingness depends on their utilities being higher after trading up to
market B compared with remaining in their home in market A.
The wealth of households in market A who are potential buyers in
market B is:
KnB(i, t)= KiA(i,t-1)+ pA(t)hA - pA(t-1)hA -Ψm
where Ψm is the remaining mortgage. Suppressing the time indices t and
t-1, and rewriting pA(t-1)hA +Ψm as φm, the mean wealth K nB of the
potential buyers in market B is given by:
(A18) K nB = K iA + pAhA − φm
where K iA is the mean wealth of KiA(i,t-1). The lifetime wealth
constraint is:
∞

N

t =0

t =1

(A19) ∑ δ t ct .qt + (1 − φL ) p B .hB + ∑ δ t hB F = K nB + p B .hB .
Similar to the result of sub-section (ii), we have U(hB)> U(hA) if and
only if:
 K nB − ϕ 2 B p B
 K iA − ϕ 2 A p A

β1 ln(hB / h A ) + β 2 ln


 > 0 .


Define:
(A20) K B* = ϕ 2 B p B − ( hB / h A ) − β / β ϕ 2 A p A + ( hB / h A ) − β / β K iA = ϕ B p B − ϕ BA p A + ϕ B 0 .
If and only if KnB(i, t)>K*B will U(hB)> U(hA) and the household
switches homes from market A to B. Otherwise, it will remain in market
A.
1

2

1

2

B. Equilibrium Solutions of the Two Housing Market Prices
The relationship between pA and pB can be obtained by
substituting (11) into (16) in the main text:
(B1) p B =
=

2τ hB γ B ( K iA + p A h A − φm ) + p Aτ ϕ BA hB γ B − τ ϕ B 0 hB γ B + θ B p B

θ B + τ ϕ B hB γ B

p A ( 2h A + ϕ BA )τ hB γ B + 2τ hB γ B ( K iA − φm ) − τ ϕ B 0 hB γ B + θ B p B

θ B + τ ϕ B hB γ B
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To find the model’s solution, we also need the market equilibrium
condition in the low-quality market A. The number of new buyers nA
[see (10)] in market A plus the initial house owners iA should be equal to
the developers’ supply plus the number of sellers in market A. The
number of sellers in market A in turn equals the number of new house
buyers nB [see (13)] in the high-quality housing market B. That implies:
(B2) hAnA + hAiA = hAnB + θA( pA - p A ) + HA.
Substituting (3), (10), (11), and (13) into (B2) yields:
(B3) γA ( 2τ hA K ' - τ ϕA pA hA + τ ϕRA hA )
= [ 2τ( K iA + pA hA - φm) - τ ϕB pB + τ ϕBA pA - τ ϕB0 ]hAγB + θApA p A θA.
Substituting (B1) into (B3), we have:
γA ( 2τ K ' hA - τ ϕA pA hA + τ ϕRA hA )
= pA [2τ hA2γB +τ ϕBA hAγB +θA] + 2τ( K iA - φm)hAγB - τ ϕB0hAγB pA

θA
− τ γ Bϕ B h A

p A ( 2h A + ϕ BA )τ hB γ B + 2τ hB γ B ( K iA − φm ) − τ ϕ B 0 hB γ B + θ B p B

θ B + τ ϕ B hB γ B

Hence,
τ h A (2γ A K '+γ Aϕ RA + γ Bϕ B 0 ) + θ A p A − 2τ h Aγ B ( K iA − φm )

pA =

∆

τγ B ϕ B h A

2τ h B γ B ( K iA − φ m ) − τ γ B ϕ B 0 h B + θ B p B

θ B + τ ϕ B hBγ B

+

(B4)

pA =

2τ h Aγ A
∆

∆
K '+α A

where
(B5) ∆ = τ h A [2h Aγ B + ϕ BAγ B + ϕ Aγ A ] + θ A − τ 2γ B2ϕ B h A hB
=

2h A + ϕ BA
θ B + τ ϕ B hBγ B

τ h Aθ B [2h Aγ B + ϕ BAγ B + ϕ Aγ A ] + θ Bθ A + τ ϕ B h B (θ A + τ ϕ A h Aγ A )γ B
>0
θ B + τ ϕ B hB γ B

and
τ h A (ϕ RAγ A + ϕ B 0γ B ) + θ A p A − 2τ h Aγ B ( K iA − φm ) + τγ Bϕ B h A
αA =

∆

25

2τ h B γ B ( K iA − φm ) − τ γ Bϕ B 0 hB + θ B p B

θ B + τ ϕ B hB γ B

Thus a positive shock to the wealth of the potential buyers in the lowquality housing market will increase its price; that is,
(B6)

dp A 2τh Aγ A
=
>0.
dK '
∆

This is Proposition 1 of the main text, which is derived directly from
(B4). To solve for pB, we rewrite (B1) as:
(B7)

pB = p A

where α B =

[2h A + ϕ BA ]τ hBγ B

θ B + τ ϕ B hBγ B

+αB

2τ γ B hB ( K iA − φm ) − τ γ Bϕ B 0 hB + θ B p B

θ B + τ ϕ B hB γ B

.

Substituting (B4) into (B7):
(B8) p B =
=

[2h A + ϕ BA ]τ γ B hB  2τ h Aγ A


K '+α A  + α B
θ B + τ ϕ B hBγ B  ∆


[2h A + ϕ BA ]τ hBγ B
2τ 2 h A hB γ Aγ B [2h A + ϕ BA ]
+αB .
K ' +α A
∆(θ B + τ ϕ B hB γ B )
θ B + τ ϕ B hBγ B

This expression gives the total effect of the wealth shock on house
prices in the high quality market, pB.
Finally, we prove Proposition 4 that transactions for lower tier
housing nA will tend to increase transactions for higher tier housing nB.
Substituting (3) and (10) of the main text into (B2) gives:
(B9) h A n A = h A n B + θ A

2τγ A K '+τ γ Aϕ RA − n A

τ γ Aϕ A

−θ A pA .

Hence,
(B10)

dn B
θA
= 1+
dn A
τ γ Aϕ A h A

>0.

This proves Proposition 4.
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Figure 1: Property Transaction Volume in Hong Kong (1984Q1 – 2001Q4)
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Notes:
1) Property transaction volume is measured by the “Agreement for sale and purchase of a
building unit”.
2) Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, various issues, Hong Kong Census and Statistics
Department.
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Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test
Property Type

Test on

No Trend

Trend

Conclusion

Class A

Level
1st difference

-1.739
-4.153**

-1.014
-4.370*

I (1)

Class B

Level
1st difference

-1.729
-4.562**

-0.981
-4.753*

I (1)

Class C

Level
1st difference

-1.527
-3.900**

-0.822
-4.206*

I (1)

Class D

Level
1st difference

-1.519
-4.206**

-0.339
-4.909**

I (1)

Notes:
1) 95% critical values for the ADF statistic with and without the trend are –2.90 and
-3.46 respectively,
2) * Indicates significance at the 5 % level, ** indicates significance at the 1% level.
3) The optimal lag is determined by AIC criteria.

Table 2. Granger Causality Tests of House Price Changes: Period 1982Q1 to 2004Q2

F-Statistic

Null hypothesis:

Probability

Causality

(1)

CLASS B does not Granger cause CLASS A
CLASS A does not Granger cause CLASS B

1.565
1.163

0.214
0.284

---

(2)

CLASS C does not Granger cause CLASS A
CLASS A does not Granger cause CLASS C

0.001
5.716

0.977
0.019*

AÆC

(3)

CLASS D does not Granger cause CLASS A
CLASS A does not Granger cause CLASS D

0.678
5.616

0.412
0.020*

AÆD

(4)

CLASS C does not Granger cause CLASS B
CLASS B does not Granger cause CLASS C

0.252
9.223

0.874
0.003**

BÆC

(5)

CLASS D does not Granger cause CLASS B
CLASS B does not Granger cause CLASS D

0.006
10.113

0.940
0.002*

BÆD

(6)

CLASS D does not Granger cause CLASS C
CLASS C does not Granger cause CLASS D

0.303
4.302

0.583
0.041*

CÆD

Notes:
1) Akaike’s final prediction error criterion identifies 1 lag for all cases.
2) * Indicates 5% significance level and ** indicates 1% significance level.
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Table 3. Granger Causality Tests of Transaction Volume Changes: July 1995 to Jan 2004

Null Hypothesis

Probability

Causality

(1)

PR 1m <..< 2m does not Granger cause HOS
HOS does not Granger cause PR 1m <..<2m

0.321
0.000*** HOS Æ PR 1m<..<2m

(2)

PR 2m < 3m does not Granger cause HOS
HOS does not Granger cause PR 2m <..<3m

0.948
0.002*** HOS Æ PR 2m<..<3m

(3)

PR 3m <..< 5m does not Granger cause HOS
HOS does not Granger cause PR 3m <..<5m

0.950
0.002**

(4)

PR 5m < ..<10m does not Granger cause HOS
HOS does not Granger cause PR 5m <..<10m

0.789
0.013*** HOS Æ PR 5m<..<10m

(5)

PR 2m<..<3m does not Granger cause 1m<..<2m
PR 1m<..<2m does not Granger cause 2m<..<3m

0.396
0.017**

PR 1m<..<2m Æ PR 2m<..<3m

PR 3m<..<5m does not Granger cause 1m<..<2m
PR 1m<..<2m does not Granger cause 3m<..<5m

0.571
0.066*

PR 1m<..<2m Æ PR 3m<..<5m

PR 5m<..<10m does not Granger cause 1m<..<2m
PR 1m<..<2m does not Granger cause 5m<..<10m

0.981
0.116*

PR 1m<..<2m Æ PR 5m<..<10m

PR 3m<..<5m does not Granger cause 2m<..<3m
PR 2m<..<3m does not Granger cause 3m<5m

0.686
0.979

No causality

PR 5m<..<10m does not Granger cause 2m<..<3m
PR 2m<..<3m does not Granger cause 5m<..<10m

0.545
0.656

No causality

0.675
0.253

No causality

(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

(10) PR 5m<..<10m does not Granger cause PR 3m<..<5m
PR 3m<..<5m does not Granger cause PR 5m<..<10M

HOS Æ PR 3m<..<5m

Notes:
1) All series are in Log level and are stationary I (0).
2) Akaike’s final prediction error criterion identifies 1 lag for cases (1), (2), (3) and (4); 3 lags for case (7),
(8), (9) and (10) and 5 lags for case (5) and (6)
3) Significance levels are ** 1%, * 5%.
4) The price ranges are in millions of $HK.
5) Variable Names:
HOS - Registrations of Home Ownership Scheme Flats
PR1M<..<2M - Registrations of Private Residential: 1 to 2 million
PR2M<..<3M - Registrations of Private Residential: 2 to 3 million
PR3M<..<5M - Registrations of Private Residential: 3 to 5 million
PR5M<..<10M - Registrations of Private Residential: 5 to 10 million
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Table 4. Explaining the Log of Existing Housing Transaction Volume
Variable

Coefficient

Constant

t-ratio

9.265

88.179**

TPS Dummy

-0.843

-5.892**

Asian Financial Crisis Dummy

-0.166

-0.935

House Price Appreciation Rate

0.002

0.606

R-bar squared

0.80

Notes:
1) Estimation period is for July 1995 to September 2001 using monthly data.
2) **Indicates a 1% significance level.
3) DW-statistic = 2.05.
4) An AR (1) procedure was used to correct for autocorrelation.
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Variable list
A
B
αA, αB
βc, β1, β2
ct

symbol for low-quality market
symbol for high-quality market
parameters in equilibrium price formulas
fixed parameters.
quantity of composite consumption at time period t
δ
discount factor of a consumer
F
fraction of the total housing expenditure that requires a fixed-payment
mortgage loan
remaining mortgage of a household
Ψm
φm
=pA(t-1)hA +Ψm
ϕ1, ϕ2h, ϕ2A, ϕ2B fixed parameters.
ϕB, ϕBA, ϕB0
parameters in the decision rule of switching from market A to B
ϕA, ϕRA
parameters in the decision rule of switching from rental market to market A
γB, γB
proportions of households satisfying the lifetime wealth constraint that
also satisfy the liquid wealth constraint in market A and B, respectively
h
fixed size of a house
fixed size of a rental house
hR
hA, hB
fixed size of a house in market A and B, respectively
HA, HB
stock of market A and B, respectively
i
individual i in housing market
number of buyers in market A and B, respectively
iA*, iB*
initial number of house owners in market A and B, respectively
iA, iB
K
present-value of lifetime wealth of the household
K(i)
lifetime wealth of household i
K
initial mean lifetime wealth of the renters
K'
new mean lifetime wealth of renters (with K ' > K )
K iA
initial mean lifetime wealth of the home-owners in market A

K nB
K*A
K*B

λ

N
nA
nB

p A , pB
pA , pB
ph
pR
qt
r
SA, SB

τ
θA ,θB
u(.,.)
U(.)
W

new mean lifetime wealth of the home-owners in market A who are
potential buyers in market B (with K nB > K iA )
critical values of mean wealth switching from rental market to market A
critical values of mean wealth switching from market A to B
shadow price of household's dynamic optimization problem
term of the mortgage loan
number of new buyers in market A
number of sellers in market A, i.e., new buyers in market B
initial prices of market A and B, respectively
price of market A and B, respectively
housing price
rental price of housing
price of composite consumption at time period t
interest rate of the mortgage loan
supply of market A and B, respectively
slope parameter in the household wealth distribution function
parameters of supply function for market A and B, respectively
utility function
present-value of the utility
liquid wealth of a household
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